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A Model For Analyzing the Constitutionality of 
Sobriety Roadblock Stops In Utah 
judge Lynn W. Davis* 
Kenneth R. Wallentine** 
Throughout the nation police departments have resorted to road-
blocks for enforcement of drunk driving laws. Utah is no exception, and 
should not be. However, courts and legislatures need direction on how 
to approach the constitutionality of such roadblocks. This article 
presents a model for analyzing the constitutionality of sobriety 
checkpoints. 
Officers of one major Utah city police department established 
roadblocks at random, without supervisory or prosecutorial review. At 
these roadblocks, drivers were stopped on a busy city center street 
under the guise of a driver's license checkpoint. There were no warning 
signs and no advance public notice. Not coincidentally, the roadblock 
was positioned in front of the city's most popular bar. The individual 
officers determined how long, if at all, each driver would be detained. A 
police car flashing a red spotlight blocked the right traffic lane, while 
two officers stood in the left lane. If a driver was to be detained for 
sobriety tests, his vehicle was placed in front of the police car, and 
roadblock operations terminated. 1 
Another roadblock, operated by the police department in a major 
Utah city, draws a sharp contrast to the roadblock described above. The 
police department plans roadblocks in conjunction with the City Attor-
ney's office, and a deputy city attorney is present at the roadblock to 
monitor conditions. The operational plan for the roadblock is defined 
well in advance, after study of areas with high drunk driving arrest 
* Judge Davis is a judge with the Fourth Circuit Court, State of Utah. Prior to his appoint-
ment he had an active career in public law, private practice and legal teaching. He graduated with 
the charter class from the J. Reuben Clark Law School in 1976. 
** Kenneth R. Wallentine is a candidate for graduation, J. Reuben Clark Law School, !990. 
He is a veteran police officer, now working with the firm of Watkiss & Campbell, Salt Lake City. 
I. The second co-author participated in such roadblocks operated as part of a "shotgun" 
approach to cleaning up the downtown area of a principal Utah city. Other roadblocks were 
operated at random, and entirely at the individual officer's discretion. The Chief of Police some-
time later considered the practice and prohibited further roadblocks of any type. While this may 
well be a worst-case occurrence, several police agencies in Utah continue to operate roadblocks 
under questionable circumstances. 
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rates. Intrusion is kept to a minimum under guidelines drafted by the 
city attorney, after careful consideration of constitutional law. Officers 
are specially trained in traffic control and roadblock safety. A mobile 
Breathalyzer unit is used at the roadblock site. Front page news stories, 
and radio broadcasts, warn the public in advance of the roadblock.2 
Several Utah State trial courts, both District and Circuit, have 
considered sobriety roadblocks, resulting in inconsistent decisions.3 
While the extent of analysis and decisive factors in these cases vary 
significantly, they do provide some guidance. However, opinions which 
lack a detailed reference to the operational facts, guidelines, standards 
and policies of the respective law enforcement agencies offer but limited 
concrete guidance. Only one of the cases references the Utah Constitu-
tion; none address the issue of statutory authorization for roadblocks; 
and all the decisions appear to rely exclusively on general fourth 
amendment jurisprudence arguments. These decisions parallel the vast 
majority of other state courts which also conduct their analysis exclu-
sively in fourth amendment terms. This apparent weak analysis may be 
the result of inadequate briefing and lack of articulation of pertinent 
legal points by trial counsel. 
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals 
has had the occasion to analyze the constitutionality of employing road-
blocks to detect drivers who are under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs.• Nor has either court addressed the issue of roadblocks con-
2. News stories concerning the roadblock operated by West Valley City were published in 
the Deseret News, October 11, 1988, at B-1. Roadblocks were conducted by the West Valley 
Police Department on three successive weekends beginning October 15, 1988. 
3. Decisions of Utah District and Circuit Courts: State v. Sims, No. 151-D (4th Dist. Ct. 
Feb. 24, 1989)(denying a motion to suppress evidence, relying on the minimal intrusion at the 
highly structured roadblock, but ignoring extensive briefing of constitutional issues under the Utah 
Constitution); West Valley City v. Lujan, No. CRA 84-85 (3rd Dist. Ct., Jun. 6, 1985)(affirming 
the decision of the Cir. Ct., upholding the constitutionality of the roadblock); State v. Crary, No. 
CRA 83-82, (3rd Dist. Ct. Aug. 3, 1984 )(finding the search and seizure unreasonable and re-
versed the decision of the 3rd Cir. Ct., Murray Department); Holt v. Schwendiman, No. C84-
2955 (3rd Dist. Ct. Oct. 2, 1984)(in a civil appeal from a driver's license suspension, ruling that 
the subject mass roadblock stop constituted an "unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amend-
ment"); State v. Zisumbo, No. 020534 (2nd Cir. Ct. Jan. 11, 1984)(granting a motion to suppress 
all evidence gathered from a roadblock stop and agreeing with the analysis set out by the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. 1984), and the Illinois Appel-
late Court in People v. Bartley, 125 Ill. App. 3d 575, 466 N.E.2d 346 (1984)). 
4. One case concerning a roadblock has been decided by the Utah Court of Appeals, however 
the perfunctory opinion was withheld from publication. In State v. Timothy Joe, 870537-CA 
(Utah App. Sept. 30, 1988)(opinion withheld from publication), the court invalidated a DUI con-
viction. The defendant was arrested at a police roadblock. The state failed to file a brief and failed 
to appear for oral argument. The court stated that it was not inclined to perform prosecution 
counsel's research and briefing duties. 
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ducted for administrative purposes. 11 The United States Supreme Court 
has never ruled on the constitutionality of a non-permanent, "routine" 
sobriety roadblock and thus has not conclusively balanced competing 
individual and governmental interests. 
It is futile to attempt to proclaim the precise limits within which 
all roadblocks may be considered to be constitutionally permissible, 
since courts have examined the validity of a roadblock by careful dissec-
tion of the operational facts. Practitioners and judges alike in Utah are 
required to analyze the constitutionality of administrative and sobriety 
checkpoints without benefit of clear precedent. In light of the above, we 
suggest the following as a possible analytical approach and model for 
proper briefing of the issue in Utah courts (as well as other state's 
courts which have called for analysis under their respective state 
constitutions). 
I. PROPOSED MoDEL FOR ANALYSIS 
A. State Statutory Considerations 
In order to be constitutional a roadblock must be premised upon 
state statutory authority, either explicit or implicit. Without such au-
thority the roadblock is per se unconstitutional. 
B. State Constitutional Authority 
The constitutionality of a roadblock should also be considered in 
light of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
C. U. S. Constitution Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
A judge or practitioner should then couple her state constitutional 
inquiry with that of a federal analysis. Although she may choose to rely 
solely upon one approach to the exclusion of the other, it is important 
to review the ever-expanding, and often confusing, body of case law 
which relies upon fourth amendment considerations to give understand-
ing to current Utah law and how future decisions may diverge from 
federal constitution-based analysis. Certain justices of the Utah Su-
preme Court have indicated that they desire briefs considering both 
constitutions. 6 The balance of the discussion details and supports the 
5. In a "non-roadblock" case the Utah Supreme Court intimated that a roadblock might be 
constitutionally permissible under exigent circumstances. The court did not address sobriety road-
blocks. State v. Torres, 29 Utah 2d 269,271, 508 P.2d 534, 536 (1973). Roadblocks which are 
operated temporarily to apprehend fleeing felons have long been upheld as reasonable. See, e.g., 
United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1980). 
6. See infra notes 66-67. 
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above-suggested analytical procedure. 
II. STATE STATUTORY CoNSIDERATIONS 
The major question is whether, irrespective of constitutional ques-
tions, Utah law enforcement agencies are explicitly or implicitly au-
thorized by state law to establish checkpoints where vehicles are 
stopped for sobriety investigation or for other administrative purposes. 
The U.S. Supreme Court does not assume that officers are entitled to 
conduct any search or seizure unless specifically proscribed by the 
fourth amendment; rather statutory authority is required. For example, 
in the case of Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 7 the Court 
ordered suppression of evidence seized in an unconsented search be-
cause the officers lacked statutory authority, even though their actions 
would not have violated the fourth amendment.8 Prosecutors must be 
prepared to meet this concern with statutory authority, express or im-
plied. Otherwise, the ground is ripe for suppression of any evidence 
gained through a roadblock at the most preliminary stage of the in-
quiry. The Oregon Supreme Court, in Nelson v. Lane County, stated 
that it had often "stressed the need to examine statutory authority and 
the limitations imposed by the authority before reaching any constitu-
tional question. " 9 
A. Authority in Utah 
There is no express authority found in Utah law which would 
sanction sobriety roadblock activities. 10 In order to enforce "Driving 
Under the Influence" (DUI) laws, enforcement agencies must rely 
upon general police powers providing for public safety and welfare. 11 
Some implication of a specific charge to enforce DUI law is found in 
the application of the state excise tax on beer, which is intended to 
finance the efforts of police to combat the DUI epidemic, as well as to 
fund rehabilitation of offenders. 12 
Sheriffs and their deputies are granted authority to preserve the 
7. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
8. !d. at 77. 
9. Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 102 n.2, 743 P.2d 692, 695 n.2 (1987). 
10. We know of no extant authority under Utah law which would support a finding of 
implied power to conduct a roadblock, sobriety or otherwise. We cannot be certain whether the 
Utah Supreme Court would expand general police powers to this degree. Nonetheless, implied 
authority may well be argued through the empowering statutes for the various enforcement 
agencies. 
11. See infra notes 12-14. 
12. UTAH Com: ANN.§ 32A-1-14 (Supp. 1988). 
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peace and make all lawful arrests. 13 Municipal police officers are 
granted authority "at all times to preserve the public peace, prevent 
crime, detect and arrest offenders . . . protect persons and property, 
remove nUisances existing in the public streets, roads and highways, 
enforce every law relating to the suppression of offenses, and perform 
all duties required of them by ordinance or resolution." 14 The State 
Highway Patrol is authorized to enforce the state laws and rules and 
regulations governing use of the state highways and to regulate traffic 
on all state highways and roads, as well as operate the ports of entry. 111 
Further, the powers and duties conferred upon the Commissioner of 
Public Safety and members of the Highway Patrol are supplementary 
to, and not a limitation upon the powers and duties of other peace of-
ficers in the state. 16 The Highway Patrol has comprehensive powers, 
while a county sheriff has the least statutory authority, explicit or 
implicit. 17 
Since Utah appellate courts have not considered a roadblock case, 
they have never addressed the issue of "explicit v. implicit" statutory 
authority to conduct a roadblock, although other jurisdictions have done 
so. States remain divided on the issue. The Oregon Supreme Court, in 
the recent case of Nelson v. Lane County, 18 observed "roadblocks are 
seizures of the person or the person's effects. For this reason, the au-
thority to conduct roadblocks cannot be implied. Before they search or 
seize, executive agencies must have explicit authority from outside the 
executive branch." 19 This case was a civil action for a declaratory judg-
ment. The court noted that the authority relied upon by the state police 
was not sufficiently specific, leaving open the possibility that a direct 
statute would cure the authority deficiency. 20 The Oregon Supreme 
Court recognized that enforcement of many criminal laws is conducted 
through methods authorized by statutes charging the police agencies 
with their general duties. Yet the court also decided two other road-
block cases on the same day ,21 and in both cases, it ordered that evi-
dence obtained at the roadblock be suppressed on the grounds that the 
roadblock operation lacked explicit statutory authority. 
13 UTAH Com ANN.~ 17-22-2 (1987) 
14. LIAII COllE ANN.§ 10-3-914 (1986). 
15. CrAll Com ANN. § 27-10-7 (Supp. 1988). 
16. See UTAH Cmn. ANN.§ 27-10-4 (Supp. 1988). 
17. UTAH Com. ANN.§§ 27-10-4 to -5, 41-1-17 (1953, 1988 & Supp. 1988). 
18. 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 (1987) 
19. 304 Or. at 103-04, 743 P.2d at 695 (emphasis added). 
20. /d. 
21. State v. Boyanovsky, 304 Or. 131,743 P.2d 711 (1987); State v. Anderson, 304 Or. 139, 
743 P.2d 715 (1987) 
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An Oklahoma court, in State v. Smith, 22 was not persuaded by the 
state's theory which would sanction roadblock stops on the basis of its 
police power to provide for the public safety and welfare. The court 
found "no statutory authority which would support, directly or indi-
rectly, the [ s ]tate's contention that it has the power to establish check-
points to inspect all motorists to discern if any are intoxicated. " 23 
A middle ground between requiring explicit statutory authority as 
opposed to allowing roadblocks under general police powers is found in 
the leading case of Ingersoll v. Palmer. 24 There the California Su-
preme Court denied a writ of mandamus which sought to prevent the 
California Highway Patrol from operating roadblocks. The court found 
that the roadblocks were administered as part of a regulatory adminis-
trative scheme authorized by state law, aimed at improving highway 
safety through deterring drunk drivers rather than detection of viola-
tors.25 This case can be distinguished from Nelson v. Lane County26 
insofar as the California court was able to rely on the administrative 
scheme aimed at improving highway safety. Although the administra-
tive or regulatory argument may be convincing, it has no current appli-
cability in the state of Utah. Unlike a number of state legislatures 
which have enacted statutes authorizing the implementation of road-
blocks27, to date the Utah Legislature has not done so. 
Many courts are willing to accept evidence obtained in roadblocks 
operated under a presumption of implied statutory authority. An Illi-
nois appellate court stated that 
[ c ]riminal statutes do contain an implied right of the police to en-
force them. While there are state and federal constitutional limitations 
on the means of enforcement, these limits are constitutional and not 
inherent in every criminal statute .... Absent evidence of some con-
trary intent, the police should be able to enforce those laws in a con-
stitutional manner.28 
Even though the Oregon Court in Nelson declined to accept an 
implied authority theory, it summarized the "implicit authority" argu-
ment in the following language: 
Much criminal and regulatory law enforcement activity takes place 
22. 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984). 
23. /d. at 565. 
24. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987). 
25. /d. 
26. 304 Or. 97, 103-04, 743 P.2d 692, 695-96 (l9R7) 
27. See People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 529 n.4, 473 N.E.2d l, 6 n.4, 483 N.Y.S.2d M9, 654 
n.4 (1984). 
28. People v. Estrada, 68 Ill. App. 3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 128, 1 D-34 ( l '>79)(crnphasis added). 
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pursuant to authority implied from a broad statutory directive. A 
broad directive to enforce criminal laws, ... together with the specifi-
cation of crimes developed by lawmakers, implies authority to under-
take tasks necessary to carry out the delegated function. By and large, 
agencies of the executive branch are free to carry out their assigned 
responsibilities in ways of their own choosing. Making explicit the 
manner in which an agency is to accomplish its task falls to the 
agency head or that official's designee to instruct or sub-delegate to 
subordinate officials.29 
363 
We agree with the Oregon Supreme Court that if no explicit or 
implicit authority to conduct the roadblock activity is found, the arrest 
must fail. 30 
B. Additional Statutory Concerns 
If a court accepts implied authority or finds explicit authority, its 
inquiry is not complete. The court must further examine any applica-
ble statutory limitations. Consider the language of the following ex-
cerpts from the Utah Code, "[a) peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has com-
mitted or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions."31 The authority of municipal police officers to effect an arrest 
IS likewise statutorily limited: 
The members of the police force shall have the power and authority, 
without process, to arrest and take into custody any person who shall 
commit or threaten or attempt to commit in the presence of the of-
ficer, or within his view, any breach of the peace, or any offense di-
rectly prohibited by the laws of this state or by ordinance.32 
Note that the foregoing statutory restraints may arguably be more 
stringent than the fourth amendment, as Utah law requires "reasonable 
suspicion" as a necessary prerequisite to making a stop. The fourth 
amendment does not always so require. While the United States Su-
preme Court has required "some quantum of individual suspicion" as a 
general prerequisite to a constitutional search and seizure, it has ruled 
that the fourth amendment imposes no "irreducible requirement" of 
such suspicion. The Court has carved out a few established and well-
delineated exceptions dealing with airport security, zoning violation en-
29. Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 103, 743 P.2d 692, 695 (1987). 
30. Nelson, 304 Or. at 105, 743 P.2d at 696 (citing State v. Atkinson, 298 Or. I, 8-9, 688 
P.2d 832, 836-837 (1984)). 
31. UTAH Com: ANN. § 77-7-15 (1982). 
32. UTAH Com: ANN. § 10-3-915 (1986). 
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forcement, border control activity, frisk searches and warrantless ad-
ministrative searches of commercial property.33 
III. STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNSIDERATIONS 
A. Separate Analyses Under State and Federal Constitutions Are 
Judicially Proper 
The United States Supreme Court has expressed its respect for 
state courts through abstaining from review when practicable. Review 
of state court decisions interpreting a right guaranteed under the 
United States Constitution is limited to cases where the state court may 
have erred. 34 When there are bona fide adequate and separate state 
grounds for the result, the federal courts will not act. 311 In the past few 
years, the Utah Supreme Court has begun to shape and refine the pa-
rameters of protection afforded by the fourth amendment, but it has 
never decided a search and seizure case by exclusive reliance on ade-
quate and separate state grounds. Article I, section 14 of the Constitu-
tion of Utah provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
sea;-ched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
The foregoing language of the Utah Constitution is nearly identical to 
the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. That may be 
one reason why the Utah Supreme Court "has never drawn distinctions 
between the protections afforded by the respective constitutional provi-
sions. Rather, the [ c ]ourt has a! ways considered the protections afforded 
to be one and the same."36 Judge Greenwood of the Utah Court of 
Appeals has also noted that the Utah Supreme Court has decided 
search and seizure cases under the United States Constitution's fourth 
33. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United Statt·s v Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 
(1972); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 
U.S. 72 (1970); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 
523 (1967); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Schafer, 461 
F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1972); Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972). 
34. See gmerally Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
35. /d. 
36. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988). In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Zimmerman denounces that text as dictum squarely at odds with the tone of footnote number 
eight in the majority opinion. The Utah Supreme Court continues to rely on federal precedent 
interpreting the fourth amendment in search and seizure cases. See, e.g., State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 
1380, 1382-84 (Utah 1986); State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389-92 (Utah 1986). 
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amendment, "eschewing a different standard."37 
That position is further strengthened by reference to the record 
respecting the adoption of article I, section 14. There is nothing in the 
textual language or in the legislative history of its adoption which 
would suggest that the framers intended that it be differently inter-
preted from the fourth amendment. 38 In addition, there are numerous 
criminal cases (not involving search and seizure issues) where the Utah 
Supreme Court has concluded that the state constitutional provision has 
the same scope of protection as its federal counterpart. 39 In light of 
these observations, why should a state constitutional consideration 
based on article I, section 14, be part of any analytical model for the 
Utah bar? In the following section we propose several practical reasons 
for using a separate analysis. 
While it is true that the Utah Supreme Court has consistently re-
fused to interpret article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution differ-
ently from the fourth amendment, it has not foreclosed that possibility. 
The question remains open. 40 The court confirmed in State v. Brooks, 41 
37. State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 95 n.7 (Utah App. 1987)(citations omitted). 
38. Article I, sertion 14 was mentioned only in brief passing in the proceedings and debates 
of the State Constitutional Convention. The entire record appears as follows: "The Chairman: 
Gentlemen, we will take up section 14. section 14 was read and passed without amendment." 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVEN-
TION 1895, 319 (1898) 
39. See Brief f(Jr the State of Utah at 20-21, State v. Babbell. Case No. 21033, (pending 
before the Utah Supreme Court)(citing State v. Nelson 725 P 2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986)(admis-
sion of hearsay statements not a violation of the right to confrontation under either U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI or UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12); State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 275 (Utah 
1986)(rule that admission of out-of-court statements under the circumstances of the case created no 
confrontation problem is the same under federal and state constitution); State v. Banks. 720 P.2d 
1380, 1385 (Utah 1986)(interpreting in parallel fashion the speedy trial provisions contained in 
UTAH CONST. art. I,§ 12 and U.S. CONST. amend. VI); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261,265-
67 (Utah 1986)(holding that the "Utah and the federal cruel and unusual punishment provisions 
apply to this case in the same fashion", and equal protection analysis is the same under both 
constitutions); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985)(holding that, as under federal law, 
inventory searches are permitted by UTAH CON ST. art. I, § 14 ); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 
1341, 1343 (Utah 1984 )(in the context of the instant case "article I, li 9 [of the Ctah Constitution I 
does not give the defendant more extensive protections than those afforded by the eighth amend-
ment [of the federal constitution]); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203-06 (lJtah 1984)(ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel analysis same under UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12 and U.S. CO;.,'ST. 
amend. VI); State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 585 n.5 (Utah 1984) rert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 
(1984) ("[The Utah Supreme Court] recognizes no distinrtion between the protection against ex 
post facto laws provided by the Utah and the United States Constitutions"); McNair v. Hayward, 
666 P.2d 321, .\23 (Utah 1983)(the double jeopardy provisions of the U.S. CON ST. amend. V 
and of the UTAH CONST. art I. § 12 "have the same content")). 
40. See, e.g., State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah 1986)(noting that what the appropri-
ate remedy might be if the defendant has argued that the officer's artion violated his rights under 
article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution is an open question). 
41. 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981 ). 
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that a "state may construe its own constitution more narrowly than the 
federal constitution even though the provisions involved may be simi-
lar."42 That principle paved the way for the court to announce that the 
construction of a state constitutional provision was not controlled by the 
federal court's construction and application of its federal counterpart.43 
In civil cases, the court has actively looked to the Utah Constitution to 
decide a variety of issues.44 
B. State Constitutions May Provide Greater Protections Against Un-
reasonable Searches 
Judge Billings, in her dissenting opmwn in State v. Larocco, 411 
recognized the need for a state constitutional analysis in the vehicle 
search and seizure area. She observed that "[ s ]tate courts responding to 
the confusing and restrictive new federal interpretations are relying on 
an analysis of their own search and seizure provisions to expand consti-
tutional protection beyond those mandated by the fourth amendment, 
often directly avoiding applicable United States Supreme Court 
precedent. "46 
In a recent opinion the Utah Supreme Court announced its inter-
est in the applicability of a Utah Constitution, article I, section 14 ar-
gument by stating that "[i]ndeed, choosing to give the Utah Constitu-
tion a somewhat different construction may prove to be an appropriate 
method for insulating the state's citizens from the vagaries of inconsis-
tent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal 
courts.''47 
42. /d. at 539. 
43. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). The Utah Supreme Court stated 
[a]lthough article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution incorporates the same general 
fundamental principles as are incorporated in the Equal Protection Clause, our con-
struction and application of article I, section 24 are not controlled by the federal court's 
construction and application of the Equal Protection Clause. Case law developed under 
the fourteenth amendment may be persuasive in applying article I, section 24, but that 
law is not binding so long as we do not reach a result that violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
/d. (citations omitted). It must be stressed that the language of article I, § 24 of the Utah Consti-
tution and the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is dissimilar, although 
these provisions embody the same general principle. 
44. See generally Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984); Johnston v. Stoker, 685 P.2d 
539, 540-43 (Utah 1984); Timpanogos Planning & Water Management Agency v. Central Utah 
Water Conservancy Dist., 690 P.2d 562, 568-70 (Utah 1984); Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 
685 P.2d 515, 520-22 (Utah 1984); KUTV v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513, 521 (Utah 1983). See also 
Note, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Constitution, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 320-21. 
45. 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987). 
46. /d. at 104 (Billings, J., dissenting). 
47. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988)(citations omitted). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed the wisdom of a separate 
body of state constitutional law. In Michigan v. Long, 48 Justice 
O'Connor noted that "[i]t is fundamental that state courts be left free 
and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. "49 The 
New Jersey Supreme Court has noted several compelling reasons for 
finding that their state constitution is a more appropriate vehicle to re-
solve questions concerning search and seizure issues. The court specifi-
cally opined that local issues are best resolved through state constitu-
tional analysis. 50 The landmark case of Delaware v. Prouse/1 often 
cited in support of roadblocks, acknowledged that highway safety and 
law enforcement is primarily a local concern. 52 
In many cases, state constitutions may provide a greater limitation 
on the government than do the parallel provisions in the United States 
Constitution. State courts have the latitude to look to their respective 
constitutions. 53 A growing number of states are deciding roadblock 
cases exclusively on independent state grounds. A New Jersey appellate 
court stated in State v. Kirk54 that "structural differences in the state 
and federal constitutions and matters of particular state interest or local 
concern are two factors to be considered in developing an independent 
body of state constitutional law."55 The court in Kirk found that the 
subject roadblock was unconstitutional since it rested too heavily on the 
discretion of the field officers. The well-reasoned opinion was rendered 
on state constitutional grounds exclusively, not on federal constitutional 
grounds. 56 A recent New Hampshire roadblock decision also relied 
solely on state constitutional grounds to find a roadblock 
unconstitutional. 57 
In addition, the Washington Supreme Court recently found a so-
briety checkpoint illegal based on independent state grounds. The court 
stated that "[ w ]hen parties allege violation of rights under both the 
United States and Washington Constitutions, this court will first inde-
pendently interpret and apply the Washington Constitution in order, 
48. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
49. !d. at 1041 (citations omitted). 
50. State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 358-72, 450 A.2d 952, 962, 969 (1982). 
51. 440 u.s. 648 (1979). 
52. !d. 
53. State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982); State v. Williams, 93 N J. 39, 459 
A.2d 641 (1983) See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977); Developments in the Law-Interpretation of State Consti-
tutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324 ( 1982). 
54. 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271, 1274 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985). 
55. !d. at pinpoint, 493 A.2d at 1274. 
56. !d. 
57. State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 499 A.2d 977 (1985). 
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among other concerns, to develop a body of independent jurisprudence, 
and because consideration of the United States Constitution first would 
be premature. "118 The court went on to say that "the textual language 
of article 1, section 7 [of the Washington Constitution], provides greater 
protection to individual pnvacy interests than the [ f)ourth 
[a]mendment."119 
State constitutional grounds were also at the foundation of a recent 
Idaho decision. In State v. Henderson, 60 the Idaho Supreme Court re-
versed a denial of a suppression order after scrutiny of the roadblock 
under the Idaho Constitution, which is identical to the fourth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. The court considered IDAHO 
CoDE § 19-621, which authorizes roadblocks to apprehend persons rea-
sonably believed to be in violation of Idaho law, and found reasonable 
suspicion to be a condition precedent to the use of a roadblock. Justice 
Huntley, writing for the majority, stated that the court reached its con-
clusion solely on the grounds of the state constitution.61 
Nearly every court which has addressed the constitutionality of 
roadblock stops has adopted a balancing test involving the factors of 
public interest against the right of an individual to personal security, 
free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement officers. In Utah 
the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice likewise 
probably would be judged by balancing its intrusion on the citizen's 
article 1 § 14 interests against its promotion of legitimate state interests. 
One can make a compelling argument that the state constitutional anal-
ysis is a "more appropriate vehicle" to resolve the competing state and 
personal interests. Regardless, the prominent balancing test advanced in 
Brown v. Texas62 is equally applicable to a state or federal constitu-
tional analysis. While the majority of the arguments rely on fourth 
amendment cases and concerns, most are also applicable to a state con-
stitutional consideration, since the competing interests are the same. 
C. A Standard for State Constitutional Review of Sobriety Road-
blocks and an Incentive for Its Use 
In formulating an argument under a state or federal constitutional 
analysis, a practitioner or court may look to a growing number of Utah 
cases enunciating a reasonable suspicion standard for a "criminal inves-
58. City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 755 P.2d 775, 776 (1988)(emphasis 
added). 
59. /d. 
60. 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988). 
61. Id. 
62. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). See infra note 78. 
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tigative stop."63 Once this review is completed, argument may be ad-
vanced respecting constitutionality under the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. Similar though they may be, one cannot make the error 
of proceeding to a federal analysis without examining the state constitu-
tion. The Mississippi Supreme Court recently underscored that "[a] 
procedure may be perfectly in accord with the United States Constitu-
tion and yet run afoul of state constitutional or statutory 
requirements."64 
Justice Zimmerman of the Utah Supreme Court has observed that 
the Supreme Court has not yet undertaken independent state constitu-
tional analysis of remedies for improper searches. 611 We believe that it is 
fair to say that the Utah Supreme Court has traditionally followed the 
federal lead on search and seizure cases; indeed, it has not departed 
dramatically from the growing body of federal law in its analysis.66 
While Utah has developed no independent or separate body of 
state constitutional search and seizure law, both Justices Durham and 
Zimmerman of the Utah Supreme Court have expressed a willingness 
to seriously consider an analytical approach premised on article I, sec-
tion 14 arguments. 67 Justice Zimmerman has stated that "[ t ]he federal 
law as it currently exists is certainly not the only permissible interpre-
tation of the search and seizure protections contained in the Utah Con-
63. The concept of a reasonable suspicion standard was advanced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 30 ( 1968). The Court found that a limited frisk search was justified where a "police officer 
observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude in light of his experience that 
criminal activity is afoot." For further Supreme Court discussion of a reasonable suspicion test see 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). For Utah State Supreme Court cases dis-
cussing reasonable suspicion standards see generally State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985); State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986); State 
v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987); State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984); State v. Torres, 508 P.2d 534 (Utah 1973). For Utah Court 
of Appeals cases see State v. Arroyo, 102 Utah Adv. Rpt. 34 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Baum-
gaertel, 762 P 2d 2 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Aquilar, 758 P.2d 457 (Utah App. 1988); State v. 
Bairrl, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988); State v. 
Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987). 
64. Drane v. State, 493 So. 2d 294, 297 (Miss. 1986). 
65. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 273 (Utah 1985)(Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v. 
Mendoza, 748 P 2d 181, 187 (Utah 1987)(Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
66. See supra note 42. 
67. See, e.g., State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 
1986)(Durham, J., concurring on Utah Constitution, article I & V grounds); State v. Mendoza, 
748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987)(Zimmerman, J., concurring); State Farm Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987)(Durham, J., dissenting); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah 
1987)(Zimmerman, J., concurring); American Fork City v. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 
1985)(Durham, J., for the majority, relies upon the Utah Constitution's self-incrimination provi-
sion, articles I & XII; Zimmerman, J., concurring suggests an article I, section 14 analysis). 
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stitution. " 68 Such an analysis may extend the scope of individual pro-
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures beyond that accorded 
by the fourth amendment. 
Writing for the majority in State v. Earl, 69 Justice Durham noted 
that neither the state nor the defendant had discussed or relied indepen-
dently on article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. She further 
noted that despite the court's willingness to independently interpret the 
Utah Constitution in other areas of law, "the analysis of state constitu-
tional issues in criminal appeals continues to be ignored."70 Justice 
Durham concluded that "[i]t is imperative that Utah lawyers brief this 
Court on relevant state constitutional questions."71 Justice Zimmerman 
was equally emphatic in State v. Hygh, 72 stating that "[s]ound argu-
ment may be made in favor of positions at variance with the current 
federal law respecting both the scope of the individual's right to be free 
from warrantless searches and seizures and the remedy for any viola-
tion of that right. " 73 
In light of these frequent announcements of receptivity, any ana-
lytical approach, particularly from a defense perspective, must seriously 
consider a state constitutional analysis. Even with these judicial invita-
tions, counsel have not seriously considered and articulated arguments 
premised on state constitutional grounds. 
Practitioners who wish to advance arguments premised on article 
I, section 14 are presented with two additional decisions; "the choice of 
when to raise state constitutional issues, and the choice of theoretical 
model of analysis and review." 
In State v. Larocco, 74 the majority agreed with Judge Billing's 
dissenting opinion on the narrow issue that any departure from a 
fourth amendment analysis approach should be announced by the Utah 
Supreme Court, not the Utah Court of Appeals.711 More recently, how-
ever, in State v. Shamblin, 76 the defendant analyzed his defense under 
both article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the fourth 
amendment. Judge Orme, of the Utah Court of Appeals, stated "[ w ]e 
need not accept defendant's invitation to address his rights under our 
state constitution as we hold that the federal Fourth Amendment [sic] 
68. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 273 (Utah 1985). 
69. 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986). 
70. /d. at 806. 
71. !d. 
72. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1984). 
73. /d. at 272. 
74. 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987). 
75. /d. at 95 n.7, 103. 
76. 763 P. 2d 425 (Utah App. 1988). 
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requires suppression of the evidence in question."77 The reader is left 
with the impression that but for the disposition of the case under the 
fourth amendment, that the Utah Court of Appeals may have reached 
the state constitutional analysis in its decision. If our reading of 
Shamblin is accurate, it manifests a slight departure from the an-
nouncement in Larocco. 
Even more recently in the case of State v. Johnson78 , the Utah 
Court of Appeals declined to entertain a state constitutional argument 
because the defendant had failed to brief or argue a state constitutional 
issue at the trial level. It appears that the court reached its decision 
squarely on the preservation issue. However, there is intimation that, 
absent the preservation defect, the court may have reached the state 
constitutional issue. The policy decision announced in Larocco to re-
frain from deciding a case on independent state grounds until such 
course is announced by the Utah Supreme Court, may be weakening. 
In Johnson the court resorted to a preservation argument in avoiding 
the state constitutional issue, while it would have been simpler to cite 
the policy decision of Larocco. However, such distinctions may also be 
fairly attributed to the differences in the various judicial panels of the 
Court of Appeals. In absence of clarification, we must recommend that 
state constitutional arguments be raised at every level of the case. 
Next, even if the reviewing court were to reach the merits in a 
roadblock case where the state constitutional arguments were well ar-
ticulated and adequately argued, it is unclear which of the various 
models of analysis would then be applied. 79 That choice is dependent 
upon the view of the Utah Supreme Court respecting the roles of fed-
eral and state constitutions. In that regard, the court has sent some 
inconsistent and mixed signals. In civil cases where the court has inde-
pendently interpreted the Utah Constitution to reach its decisions the 
analytical methodology does not appear to be entirely harmonious. One 
author has suggested that the court has failed to develop " ... a consis-
tent approach for cases in which both state and federal constitutional 
claims are made. Some cases fully examine differences between the 
Utah and United States [Constitution] provisions; others rely exclu-
sively on federal law although state claims were presented."80 The 
77. /d. at 426 n.2. 
78. 771 P.2d 326 (Utah App. 1989). 
79. Legal scholars have identified three models of review: the dual sovereignty or coequal 
model, the primacy model, and the interstitial or supplementary model. See generally Develop-
ments in the Law, The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 
1356-59 (1982). 
80. Note, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitution, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 
319, 321. 
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Utah Supreme Court has never adopted a model because it has never 
been properly presented with the question in a criminal case. The ulti-
mate choice of model may have direct bearing on the decision. 
While references to article I, section 14 arguments are principally 
in footnotes and dissenting opinions, we can fairly reach one conclusion: 
a nominal or mere invocation of the state constitution is simply insuffi-
cient. The Utah Supreme Court recently announced in State v. Laf-
ferty, 81 that "[a)s a general rule, we will not engage in state constitu-
tional analysis unless an argument for different analyses under the state 
and federal constitutions is briefed. " 82 In that respect the court has ad-
hered to the principle of judicial restraint by limiting its analysis to the 
issues raised at trial and on appeal. That position is consistent with 
previous decisions and is soundly reasoned; appellate courts ought to 
hesitate from delving into virgin territory in the absence of helpful and 
well-researched models which have been advanced by counsel. Undif-
ferentiated state and federal claims or the mere citation of the Utah and 
federal constitutions in conjunction with an argument grounded in fed-
eral constitutional principles will ordinarily lead the court to decide the 
case under the federal constitution. 
While we urge a state constitutional analysis as an important fea-
ture of our analytical model, we certainly offer no prediction regarding 
its ultimate reception or rejection at the appellate level. Search and 
seizure decisions are fact intensive; they turn not only on the applica-
tion of the correct analytical approach, but equally important, on a con-
sideration of the totality of the circumstances. 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to 
give sufficient guidance respecting an article I, section 14 analysis, al-
though it has cited with approval the general state constitutional argu-
ment approach found in State v. jewitt. 83 In that decision the Vermont 
Supreme Court takes counsel to task for failing to employ their state 
constitution, and gives an able primer on state constitutional argument. 
81. 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988). 
82. /d. at 1247 n.5. See also State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1257 n.2 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-6 (Utah 1986); cf State v. Hygh 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah 
1985)(Zimmerman, J., concurring)(arguments for different analyses under the state and federal 
constitutions should be considered if made); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah App. 
1989). 
83. 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (1985), cited in State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803,806 (Utah 1986). 
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IV. FouRTH AMENDMENT PERSPECTIVES 
A. Roadblocks Are Seizures Within the Meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, and Thus Must Be Subjected to Fourth Amendment 
Criteria 
It is well-established that roadblocks and checkpoints are seizures 
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.84 After all the above con-
cerns have been addressed, the roadblock must still meet the require-
ments for a lawful search and seizure under the fourth amendment. 
The traditional test generally demands both that a warrant be obtained 
and that there be probable cause.8 1j The Supreme Court continues to 
stress that legitimate excusal of the warrant requirement does not affect 
the probable cause requirement. 86 There are few established exceptions 
to the probable cause requirement. Among these are "Terry-type" stop 
and frisk detentions, border searches, administrative inspections, inspec-
tions of heavily regulated enterprises, airport security checks, and in-
spection of ocean-going vessels in U.S. waters.87 
It is probable that roadblocks pass muster under the doctrine of 
Carroll v. United States88 as a valid exception to the warrant require-
ment. Carroll established that an officer can conduct a warrantless 
search of a vehicle if "it is not practical to secure a warrant because the 
vehicle can be quickly moved .... " 89 The Court looked ahead to po-
tential abuse of the newly-formed doctrine, however, and cautioned: 
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a [government] agent 
were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding 
84. See generally United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. I, 16 (1968); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979). 
85. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973)(Powell, J., concurring). 
86. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342-43 (1985). 
87. In 1968 the Supreme Court articulated a lower "reasonable suspicion" standard in Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968). Border searches have been upheld as valid to detect undocumented 
aliens. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 523 (1976). Inspections to detect violations of 
health codes, building codes and industrial hygiene standards (for certain industries) have been 
allowed. See generally Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)(building code in-
spections held 'alid without particularized suspicion of violation); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 
594 (1981 )(holding warrantless general inspection of mines to not require particular suspicion); 
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)(by virtue of Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 1970, Labor Department inspectors may enter and inspect any work area subject to the Act's 
provisions). In McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1978), the court upheld magnetometer 
(metal detector) inspection of persons entering a courtroom since the search was reasonably neces-
sary to ensure security, and was not a subterfuge to gather information for criminal prosecution. 
The unfettered stopping and boarding of ships in U.S. coastal waters has been upheld in United 
States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983). The Court compared the inspections to those 
of highly regulated industries, such as liquor distilleries and firearms manufacturers. 
88. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
89. /d. at 153. 
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liquor .. [T]hose lawfully within the country, entitled to use the 
public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or 
search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to 
search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying 
contraband or illegal merchandise.90 
It is critical to recall that the fourth amendment protects "people, 
not places."91 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the restraint required in 
exercising the automobile exception to the warrant requirement in Al-
meida-Sanchez v. United States,92 stating, "the Carroll doctrine does 
not declare a field day for the police in searching automobiles. Automo-
bile or no automobile there must be probable cause for the search."93 
B. Sobriety Roadblocks Are Subject to a Balancing of Interest Analy-
sis in Determining Constitutionality 
Because sobriety roadblocks are not based upon probable cause, 
we must examine the acceptable deviations from the probable cause re-
quirement. Obviously, a roadblock is not similar to established probable 
cause exceptions such as heavily regulated enterprises, permanent bor-
der crossings, boarding of ship on the seas, or health and safety code 
enforcement. While some tenuous arguments might be made by anal-
ogy, we believe that roadblocks do not fit the criteria and formulae 
which established these particular probable cause exceptions. We con-
clude rather, that roadblocks must be viewed under an interest-balanc-
ing analysis. In automobile search cases over the last few decades the 
Supreme Court has adopted the interest-balancing approach, which is 
much less rigorous than traditional fourth amendment analysis. 94 How-
ever, the Court has not stated that it would employ a balancing test in 
all types of automobile searches. In Brown v. Texas, 911 a seminal case 
advancing the balancing analysis in automobile searches, the Court said 
it would apply the balancing test to "seizures that are less intrusive 
than a traditional arrest."96 
The Brown Court outlined the three stage balancing analysis as 
follows. The first step considers the gravity of public concerns served 
90. /d. at 153-54. 
91. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
92. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 
93. /d. at 269. 
94. The Court has been consistent in applying the balancing analysis when automobile 
searches and seizures are at issue. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)(expectation of privacy in an automobile is not as 
great as that in a personal residence); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
95. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
96. /d. at 50. 
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by the seizure as demonstrated by specific, objective facts. Second, the 
degree to which the seizure advances the public interest must be con-
sidered. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the severity of the in-
trusion on individual liberty will be weighed.97 If sobriety roadblocks 
are to stand under the fourth amendment, it must be shown that they 
effectively advance a significant public concern, and that the intrusive-
ness is reasonable. 
C. The Public Interest in Detecting Intoxicated Drivers is of Suffi-
cient Magnitude to Warrant Extraordinary Enforcement Approaches 
Without hesitation, any court may take judicial notice of the na-
tional concern with the drunk driver. Figures in the pages of newspa-
pers and on the evening news illustrate the epidemic gravity of the 
problem. Best estimates place the number of persons killed in alcohol-
related traffic accidents at 25,000 annually.98 Well over an additional 
half million are injured.99 Property damage is estimated to exceed five 
billion dollars annually .10° Congress has acted to withhold federal high-
way funds from those states failing to enact strict DUI enforcement 
provisions. 101 The Supreme Court cited the problem of drunk driving 
in South Dakota v. Neville, 102 stating "[t]he situation underlying this 
case-that of the drunk driver-occurs with tragic frequency on our 
nation's highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers is well-docu-
mented and needs no detailed recitation here. " 103 Justice Blackmun, 
writing in Perez v. Campbell, 104 noted that the "slaughter on the high-
ways exceeds the death toll of all our wars."105 Several state courts 
have unequivocally held the state interest to be compelling and over-
whelmingly in favor of the state. 106 
Data compiled by the Utah Department of Public Safety support 
the fact that Utah is not immune from the plague of drunk drivers.107 
97. !d. at 50-51; See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-83 (1975). 
98. H. R. REP. No. 867, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1982). 
99. Alcohol, Drugs & Driving, Hearing to Examine What Effect Alcohol and Drugs Have 
on Individuals While Driving, Before the Subcomm. on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1982). 
100. Lauter, The Drunk Driving Blitz, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 22, 1982, at 1, col. 2. 
101. 23 U.S.C. § 408 (1982). 
102. 459 U.S. 553 (1983). 
103. !d. at 558 (holding that refusal to submit to a blood alcohol level test may be introduced 
at trial as evidence of guilt). 
104. 402 U.S. 637 (1971 ). 
105. !d. at 657 (Blackmun, J., concurring)(footnote omitted). 
106. See, e.g., State v. Superior Ct., 143 Az. 45, 48, 691 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1985); State v. 
McLaughlin, 471 N.E.Zd 1125, 1136 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). 
107. UTAH DEP'T OF Pus. SAFETY, 1986 Utah Traffic Accident Summary (1987); UTAH 
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The gravity of concern in Utah is evidenced by the extensive history of 
legislative reform aimed at "toughening" the drunk driving statutes. 
Because of citizen demands, intense lobbying efforts and public outrage, 
the legislature within the last decade has significantly increased the 
amount of fines, added a victim restitution program, reduced the blood-
alcohol presumptive level, provided for an assessment to fund educa-
tional activities, added an "implied consent" statute, and provided for 
mandatory incarceration. In the 1988 legislative session, Senate Bill 
121 was passed, requiring an additional fee to be imposed to fund a 
Victim Advocate Board for DUI offenders. 108 
Numerous anti-drunk driving groups with catchy, aggressive acro-
nyms have sprung into being in the past decade. Moreover, member-
ship is growing at a rate generally unparalleled in civic interest 
groups. 109 Public awareness is at a new high. Pressure on law enforce-
ment administrators may well be a reason for increased used of road-
blocks. Nearly half the states use roadblocks to some degree in combat-
ing drunk drivers.no Furthermore, supplemental incentive funds are 
DEP'T OF Pus. SAFETY, Utah Traffic Accident Summary (1988); UTAH Dt:P'T. OF Pus. SAFETY, 
UTAH TRAFFIC ACCIDENT SUMMARY (1989). These reports show that in 1986, I 04 of 312 traffic 
fatalities were alcohol-related. In 1987, 82 of the 297 traffic fatalities were alcohol-related. In 
1988, 1 OS of the 297 traffic fatalities were alcohol-related. 
108. In 1982, UTAH CoDE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1953) was amended to establish the fine for a 
first offense DUI conviction at $299 (removing the $100-$299 discretionary fine). UTAH Com: 
ANN. § 41-6-44 (1982). This section was again amended in 1986 to allow the court to sentence a 
DUI offense as any other Class B misdemeanor, punishable by incarceratinn for up to 6 months, 
together with the imposition of a fine up to $1,000, or both. UTAH Com: ANN.§ 41-6-44 (1988). 
A Class A offense (involving personal injury) carries a fine of up to $2,500, together with incar-
ceration up to one year and/or both. The mandatory minimum jail term of 2 days (10 days for a 
second conviction and 30 days fore a subsequent conviction) was added to§ 41-6-44(4) in 1982. 
The Victim Restitution Fund, carrying an assessment of $100, was created in 1983. In 1979, a 
comprehensive treatment bill was passed, requiring an assessment of $150 for first-time offenders 
and an amount equal to the maximum fine for a Class B misdemeanor for repeat offenders. These 
monies are used to fund DUI rehabilitation programs. The court was also given the power to 
order reimbursement for social agencies involved in treating the convicted DUI driver. Utah added 
an "implied consent" law in 1981. Motorists driving within the state arc deemed to have given 
consent to a blood-alcohol test, or tests, requested by police. Refusal resuhs in automatic suspen-
sion of driving privileges, with no provision for a limited license. Utah belongs to the Driver's 
License Compact, extending the suspension to member states. 
109. See Insurance Information Institute, Drunk Driving in America, reprinted in Bus. 
WK., Oct. 17, 1983, at 176. Groups such as MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Drivers), SADD 
(Students Against Drunk Drivers), RID (Remove Intoxicated Drivers), have swelled in ranks, 
undertaking projects such as monitoring of court sentencing for convicted offenders, public infor-
mation campaigns, civil actions, pledges not to drive after drinking. In Utah, REDDI (Report 
Every Drunk Driver Immediately) is promoted through the Utah Highway Patrol, citizen band 
radio clubs, local police and community service agencies. 
110. 21 states are using sobriety roadblocks. NTSB, SAFETY STUDY-DETERRENCE OF 
DRUNK DRIVING: THE RoLE OF SoBRIETY CHECKPOINTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE REv-
OCATIONS, REP. SS-84-01 at 5-6 (1984)(Doc/US TD 1.127:84/01). 
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available to those states which implement procedures recommended by 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which include 
the use of sobriety roadblocks.m 
D. The Efficacy of Roadblocks zn Detection, Apprehension and De-
terrence of the Drinking Driver 
One author has characterized roadblocks as being "woefully defi-
cient" in solving the DUI problem.112 On the other side, in State v. 
Superior Court, 113 the Arizona Supreme Court found that the state had 
demonstrated a decrease in DUI accidents due to the use of Arizona 
Department of Public Safety roadblocks. A decrease of approximately 
3.5% (at the Christmas season, traditionally a time of increase) was 
classified by the court as significant. 11" However, in what is perhaps 
the most exhaustive scholarly treatment of DUI roadblocks to date, 
Professors James B. Jacobs and Nadine Strossen examined extensive 
statistical evidence and concluded that the evidence supporting the effi-
cacy of sobriety checkpoints is, at best, inconclusive. 115 
Indeed, the number of potential offenders deterred by roadblocks is 
debatable. For example, one court concluded that "common sense 
alone" was sufficient to conclude that roadblocks are effective deterrent 
measures. 116 In Delaware, the lieutenant governor has credited high-
way patrol sobriety roadblocks with a 23% decrease in alcohol related 
fatalities. 117 On the other hand, in a recent Arizona case, the court 
noted that of 5,763 vehicles stopped at the subject roadblock, only 14 
drivers were arrested for DUI (a mere 1 out of every 412 vehicles). 118 
Ill. 23 C.F.R. § 1309 (1984). 
112. Comment, Sobriety Checkpoint Roadblocks: Constitutional in Light of Delaware v. 
Prouse?, 28 ST. LoUis U.L.J. 813, 833 (1984). 
113. 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984). 
114. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. at 48-49, 691 P.2d at 1076-77. 
115. Jacobs & Strossen, Mass Investigation Without Individualized Suspicion: A Constitu-
tional and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18 U.C. DAVIS. L. REv. 595, 638-45 
(1985). 
116. People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 287, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (1985). The court con-
ceded that the apprehension rate of roadblocks might not be as high as that of traditional detection 
methods, nonetheless opining that the deterrent potential was great. 
117. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY NEWS-
l.t:TTt:R, Oct.-Dec. 1983, at 3 (quoting Delaware Lt. Gov. Michael Castle). Castle's remarks are 
unsupported by any type of empirical data, other than to show that alcohol-related fatalities did 
decrease in the year following adoption of the federally recommended strict DUI law package. It 
would he unreasonable to consider the roadblocks as other than just one factor in the decrease; 
increased public cooperation with the police, heightened traditional enforcement, aggressive patrol, 
alternative transportation programs, and even increased use of seatbelts might well have also con-
tributed to the decrease. 
118. State ex rei. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. I, 2, 663 P.2d 992, 993 (1983). 
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Such minimal success can hardly be expected to deter offenders. A 
study by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration of multi-
ple roadblocks in two different programs concluded that no deterrent 
effect was demonstrated. 119 However, France and Sweden have used 
roadblocks for over five years and have found a significant deterrent 
effect. 120 After reviewing such inconsistent data it seems fair, at least at 
this point, to agree with Jacobs and Strossen in characterizing empiri-
cal roadblock data as "inconclusive" .121 
The agency employing roadblocks as a DUI enforcement method 
should be prepared to offer data, if available, showing local efficacy in 
apprehension, or at least deterrence. However, mere inconclusive data 
alone should not prevent the use of roadblocks. No court has even at-
tempted to construct a standard against which empirical data should be 
measured. Our courts should not be transformed into centers of statisti-
cal accountancy to supplant their role in serving law and justice. 
E. The "Neutral Criteria" Examined: Limited and Controlled In-
trusion Upon the Motorist's Liberty in the Administration of 
Roadblocks 
We now turn to the final element of the balancing analysis: the 
severity of intrusion upon the motorist's fourth amendment interest. 
Many courts have proceeded directly to this facet of the analysis, disre-
garding completely the first two steps, or taking judicial notice of their 
fulfillment. In Martinez-Fuerte v. United States, 122 the Supreme Court 
weighed both objective and subjective intrusion in considering the con-
stitutionality of a permanent immigration checkpoint. The elements of 
objective intrusion include the stop itself, the physical inspection, and 
the questioning of the motorist. 123 Generally, the objective intrusion at 
a roadblock will be minimal. Most roadblocks require only a few min-
119. NAT'!. Hll;HWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 3 TRAFFIC SAFETY EVALUATION RE-
SEARCH REVIEW 5, Nov.-Dec. 1984. The same review cites a major, prolonged roadblock program 
in New Jersey where one DUI arrest resulted from every 5.2 man-hours of enforcement. Frankly, 
the authors cannot accept that a single patrol officer, at the critical hours of the night, could not 
apprehend more than 1 DUI offender. Such apprehension would be made through observation of 
objective observation of driving patterns, and the stop based on the less intrusive individualized 
suspicion, not random roadblocks. This study directly refutes an earlier report of higher levels of 
efficiency. See NTSB REP. SS-84-01, supra note 109 at 5-6 (1984 ). 
120. NTSB REP. 55-84-01, supra note 109 at 5-6. Sweden has adopted statutes specifically 
authorizing sobriety roadblocks. This measure is credited with a level of only 2o/o of weekend 
drivers in Sweden having a blood alcohol level greater than .05% (compared with 13% in the 
United States). 
121. Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 114. 
122. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
123. /d. at 558 (1976). 
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utes of the motorist's time. 12• Usually the officer speaks momentarily to 
the driver and views the interior of the vehicle, checking for alcohol 
containers and weapons. 1211 Given the momentary nature of the road-
block, it is unlikely that any roadblock would be invalidated on the sole 
basis of objective intrusion. 126 
The restraint of subjectivity by officers in roadblocks is critical. 
Nearly every case assessing the constitutionality of a roadblock ad-
dresses the "neutral target criteria" aspect of the roadblock operation, 
and bases the decision on the presence and comprehensiveness of the 
operational formula designed to promote objectivity. One court bifur-
cated its consideration of the subjective intrusion into the element of 
fright and surprise, and the element of individual officer discretion. 127 
Both are considered in the Kansas Supreme Court opinion, State v. 
Deskins. 128 This decision is cited often, and seems to be the emerging 
authoritative case. 129 There the Kansas court set forth thirteen non-
exclusive factors to be considered in arriving at a neutral criteria which 
would reduce the subjective intrusion to an acceptable minimum. These 
include: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
the degree of discretion, if any, left to the officer in the field; 
the location designated for the roadblock; 
the time and duration of the roadblock; 
standards set by superior officers; 
advance notice to the public at large; 
advance warning to the individual motorist approaching the 
roadblock; 
7) maintenance of safety conditions; 
8) degree of fear or anxiety generated by the operation of the 
roadblock; 
9) average length of time each motorist Is detained; 
124. See generally Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 491, 497 A.2d 903, 906 (1984)(fifteen to 
thirty second detention); State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 47, 691 P.2d 1073, 1077 
(1984)(five to twenty second stops); State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1984)(two to three minute stops). 
125. Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 497 A.2d 903, 907 (1984); State v. MrLaughlin, 471 
N.E.2d 1125, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). But cf People v. Bartley, 125 Ill. App. 3d 575, 466 
N.E.2d 346, 348 (1984)(use of flashlight to inspect interior of vehicle was one of the elements 
making the roadblock a "significant degree of intrusion"). 
126. Any detention beyond the initial contact gives rise to further probable cause issues. It is 
not our intent to treat such issues in this paper. 
127. State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1139 (Ind. App. 1984). 
128. State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983). 
129. See, e.g., State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1134 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); State v. 
Kirk, 202 N.J. Super 28, 493 A.2d 1271, 1280 (1985); see also State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 
314 (Iowa 1980). All cite State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan. 1983), with 
approval. 
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1 0) physical factors surrounding the location, type, and method 
of operation; 
11) the availability of a less intrusive means for combating the 
problem; 
12) the degree of effectiveness of the procedure; and, 
13) any other relevant circumstances which might bear on the 
test.l3o 
The Deskins court did not require that each factor be resolved in 
favor of the state. 131 Certain factors are crucial, such as the effectiveness 
and the degree of fear by motorists generated by the roadblock opera-
tion. These are among factors included in other courts' construction of 
permissible operational formulae. 132 Each court has placed particular 
emphasis on the first factor, requiring controls on the discretion left to 
the field officer. Unbridled discretion certainly could lead to an intoler-
able level of subjective intrusion. In State v. Kirk, the court singled out 
the discretionary factor, observing that "participation of command or 
supervisory authority in selecting the time and place based on reasona-
ble evidence of social utility is an essential constitutional ingredient and 
is necessary to satisfy the objection that the traveller not be subject to 
the discretion of the official in the field. " 133 
While there may be greater focus on a specific set of factors, no 
single factor is determinative. As with any balancing test, application to 
130. Deskins, 234 Kan. at 536, 673 P.2d at 1185. 
131. !d. 
132. See, e.g., State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Iowa 1980)(establishin~ a four 
part formula: 1) selection of site for safety considerations and visibility to oncoming motorists; 2) 
adequate warning devices, with proper illumination at night, informing motorists of the nature of 
the impending intrusion; 3) uniformed officers and marked police vehicles to establish the certainty 
of authority and police power of the community; and, 4) a pre-determination by policy-making 
administrators of the roadblock time, location, and procedures to be employed, pursuant to care-
fully formulated standards and neutral criteria); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 501, 497 A.2d 903, 
911 (1984)(offering a similar four part formula: 1) careful circumscription of field officer's discre-
tion by clear objective regulations previously established by high level administrative officials: 2) 
approaching motorists are given adequate warning of the roadblock ahead; 3) the likelihood of 
fear, apprehension or surprise is reduced by a display of legitimate police authority at the road-
block; and, 4) vehicles are stopped on a systematic, non-random basis to show drivers that they are 
not being singled out for arbitrary reasons); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 
143, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983)(deciding this case and fourteen companion cases suggesting the 
following: 1) the inconvenience to the motorist be minimized; 2) the selection procedure not be 
arbitrary; 3) safety of motorists be assured; 4) the roadblock must be systematic, not random; and, 
5) there must be a pre-arranged plan established by supervisory staff); State v. Tourtillott, 289 
Or. 845, 864-65, 618 P.2d 423, 433 (1980), cert. denied, 451 V.S. 972 (1981)(articulating their 
test as: 1) an important government interest at stake; 2) consideration of the physical and psycho-
logical intrusive nature of the roadblock procedure; 3) the efficiency of the roadblock in reaching 
the desired goal; and 4) the degree of discretion vested in the field officers). 
133. State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271, 1275 (N.J. Super. Ct. App Div. 
1985)(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)). 
357] SOBRIETY ROADBLOCKS 381 
a particular set of facts may prove difficult. 134 With no clear controlling 
authority and a multitude of factors to consider, the only avenue is to 
examine the facts and circumstances of each case. As stated by the Su-
preme Court, there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness 
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the inva-
sion which the search [or seizure] entails."1311 Law enforcement officials 
and prosecutors who choose to employ roadblocks may use the forego-
ing factors in planning their operation. The roadblock which addresses 
every minutia of constitutional law may never come to pass. Someone 
will always be prepared to be a Monday-morning quarterback. As the 
Supreme Court has noted "[a] creative judge engaged in post hoc evalu-
ation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative 
means by which the objectives of the police might have been 
accomplished. " 136 
V. CoNSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE SoBRIETY RoADBLOCKS: 
CoNCLUSION AND SuGGESTED APPROACH 
It is vital to curb the lamentable and needless deaths on Utah's 
highways attributable to drinking drivers. Without question there are 
soundly-reasoned and compelling constitutional arguments, both state 
and federal, which can be advanced for the promotion of legitimate gov-
ernmental interests and for an individual's interest in being free from 
intrusions on fundamental constitutional rights. On balance, assuming 
a properly administered roadblock, we believe that the gravity of the 
well-documented public concern in Utah and the degree to which the 
roadblock procedure facilitates detection and abatement of drunken 
drivers outweigh the minimal level of interference with individual liber-
ties. It is critical to note that we do not conclude that any extant road-
block procedures now being utilized by law enforcement agencies in 
Utah can withstand state or federal constitutional scrutiny. Without 
doubt, the first roadblock described in the introduction would be struck 
down under even the weakest constitutional examination. The second 
may or may not withstand the full gauntlet of state and federal consti-
tutional inquiry. 
We have suggested, as one facet of any rigorous analytical ap-
proach, that roadblock activity be analyzed under article I, section 14 
standards of the Utah Constitution. Whether such analysis will carry 
the day remains to be seen, but with frequent reminders from members 
134. State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 845, 864-65, 618 P.2d 423, 433 (1980), cert. denied, 451 
U.S. 972 (1981 ). 
135. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). 
136. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985). 
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of the Utah Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of Utah's own 
constitutional provisions, it cannot be ignored. Justice Zimmerman is 
eagerly optimistic that an independent state constitutional analysis will 
result in a simplification of fourth amendment jurisprudence, which, in 
his words is a "labyrinth of rules built upon a series of contradictory 
and confusing rationalizations and distinctions."137 While not everyone 
shares that enthusiasm, few would fault his contention that state consti-
tutional arguments should not be foreclosed from consideration by the 
court's unanalyzed acceptance of the federal position. 138 
Despite the multitude of obstacles to overcome in constructing a 
constitutionally permissible roadblock, it is fair to conclude that a sobri-
ety roadblock is constitutional if properly administered. 139 Careful 
planning and execution will almost assuredly prepare the roadblock to 
pass constitutional muster. We support without reservation the criteria 
advanced by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Deskins. 140 The 
element of efficiency of roadblocks in a particular jurisdiction can be 
established only through empirical study. Support may be given to the 
concept by citation of successes in other regions. 
Some consideration may be given to an additional element of prep-
aration-the administrative area search warrant. This type of warrant 
was authorized by the Supreme Court to allow area searches seeking 
building code violations. 141 One California court has suggested the area 
warrant as a precedent to a sobriety roadblock. 142 An affidavit seeking 
an area search warrant should set forth the elements considered in this 
article; statutory police power to enforce the subject law, evidence of a 
local problem, and belief that the roadblock will be effective. Further, 
the operational plans should be contained in the application, so that the 
court may give prior review of the neutrality of the criteria designed to 
reduce intrusiveness. The novelty of this approach should not deter the 
dedicated prosecutor. 
Because of the intricacies involved in balancing of interests, road-
blocks must be approached on a case-by-case basis. Although a small 
number of courts have held sobriety roadblocks to be per se unconstitu-
tional, we do not find their reasoning persuasive. A majority of the 
courts finding a particular roadblock unconstitutional have suggested or 
137. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 267, 271-72 (Utah 1985)(Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v. 
Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987)(Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
138. Hygh, 711 P.2d at 273. 
139. State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271, 1279 (Court 1985). 
140. Supra note 127. 
141. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967). 
142. In re RichardT., 185 Cal. App. 3d 732, 229 Cal. Rptr. 884, 897 (1986)(holding a 
warrant to be indispensable to the roadblock's validity). 
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intimated ways in which the fatal defect could have been cured. We 
believe that through adherence to the approach suggested by this paper, 
agencies which utilize sobriety roadblocks may avert judicial suppres-
sion of evidence. 
Judges, prosecutors and the defense bar must not blind themselves 
to the reality of highway carnage and to the anguish of its innocent 
victims. More than 25,000 are killed, hundreds of thousands injured, 
and billions of dollars of property are destroyed each year, with no 
relief in sight. 143 We do not advocate that the drunk driver be allowed 
to add the fourth amendment to his list of casualties. However, we be-
lieve that careful planning, executed with a dedicated awareness of 
state and federal constitutional requirements, will allow the employ-
ment of sobriety roadblocks, and add one more dependable weapon to 
the societal battle against the drunk driver. 
143. See supra, notes 97-99, 101-02 and accompanying text. 
